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How Smart Is Institutional Trading?
JinGi Ha and Jianfeng Hu ∗
February 9, 2020
ABSTRACT
We estimate daily aggregate order flow of individual stocks from institutional investors as well
as for hedge funds and other institutions separately. We find that the estimated institutional
order imbalance positively predicts stock return on the next day and outperforms other
institutional order flow estimates. The institutional order flow from hedge funds generates
greater and more persistent price impact than the order flow from other institutions. We
also find that hedge funds trade on well-known anomalies while the other institutions do not.
Our findings suggest that the superior trading skills of institutional investors can be largely
attributed to hedge funds.
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I. Introduction
Institutional investors are at the center of academic finance research as the professional
asset management business continues to see unprecedented growth in the United States and
worldwide. Many researchers study institutional investors’ stock picking skills by analyzing
their performance using publicly available low frequency data such as quarterly institutional
holdings or monthly fund returns.1 The low frequency data, however, are not able to capture
the exact timing of institutional trades. Therefore, it remains challenging to examine the
role of institutional trading in price discovery, the corresponding transactions cost, or how
institutional investors may trade based on short-lived information. To circumvent limitations
on institutional trading data, some studies estimate institutional order flow (IOF, hereafter)
using high frequency data on the premise that institutions are more likely to place large
orders, e.g. Lee (1992), Lee and Radhakrishna (2000), Battalio and Mendenhall (2005),
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), and Hvidkjaer (2008). However, as order splitting
becomes common, arising from a concern for trading costs, the reliability of these size-based
algorithms has been cast under serious doubt in recent sample periods, as pointed out by
Cready, Kumas, and Subasi (2014). Alternatively, several recent studies employ proprietary
data sets of institutional trading records for empirical analysis.2 However, these proprietary
data have limited coverage and can contain sample biases that impair external validity. In
this article, we present a new method for estimating aggregate order flow at the daily level
for institutional investors and for subgroups of institutions only.
1For example, Carhart (1997), Wermers (2000), Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000), Barras, Scaillet,
Wermers (2010), and Edelen, Ince, and Kadlec (2016) find weak evidence on institutional investors’ stock
picking skills using the low frequency data. On the contrary, Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Hendricks, Patel,
and Zeckhauser (1993), Kosowski, et al. (2006), Avramov and Wermers (2006), Alexander, Cici, and Gibson
(2007), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008), and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2011) show that institutions
have skills in assembling portfolios using the same databases.
2For example, Puckett and Yan (2011), Anand, et al. (2012), and Henry and Koski (2017), Chakrabarty,
Moulton, and Trzcinka (2017) use actual institutional trade data from Abel Noser, which covers about 10%
of total institutional trading as estimated by Puckett and Yan (2011). Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007)
and Busse, Clifton, and Jegadeesh (2012) use data from Plexus Group. Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003),
Boehmer and Kelley (2009), and Hendershott, Livdan, and Schurhoff (2015) use the Consolidated Equity
Audit Trail Data from NYSE. Also, Foster, Gallagher, and Looi (2011) and Frijns, et al. (2018) use actual
institutional trade data in Australia and Finland, respectively.
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We estimate daily aggregate institutional order flow by extrapolating the quarterly re-
lation between institutional ownership change in 13F and observable order flow variables
constructed using TAQ and Ancerno data. Specifically, and similar to the IOF estimation
method proposed by Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwatz (CRS, 2009), we first evaluate
the quarterly association of change in aggregate institutional holdings and aggregate order
imbalance from several transaction size bins obtained from both TAQ and Ancerno data.
Then, we fit the quarterly relation using the daily TAQ order flow and the Ancerno order
flow to retrieve daily aggregate institutional order flow. The underlying assumption of our
method is that institutional investors systematically differ from retail investors in the way
of submitting orders of different sizes, similar to what is presented by CRS. This assumption
is largely left unverifiable by CRS using TAQ data because there is not a trader-type flag in
TAQ. Unlike CRS, however, we bring actual institutional trading records from Ancerno to
enhance the linkage between institutional trading and trade size. The addition of Ancerno
data therefore provides a nontrivial contribution to estimation accuracy.
As the full set of institutional order flow is unobservable, we evaluate the performance
of our proposed order flow measure in a joint-hypothesis test using return prediction regres-
sions. There is consensus in the literature that institutions are apt to be better informed
than retail investors because institutions have direct communication channels with firms,
better relationships with sell-side analysts, and better capabilities for processing financial
information. Therefore, institutional trading can significantly contribute to the price for-
mation process. In the same spirit of prior studies, we hypothesize that a less noisy IOF is
more informative about the future stock price. In our sample of common stocks listed on
NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq markets between January 1999 and March 2012, we find that
our proposed IOF estimate, termed HH, significantly and positively predicts the returns on
the following day with a coefficient of 0.122 and a t-statistic of 11.71 in the Fama-MacBeth
(1973) regressions. A one-standard deviation change in HH is associated with a subsequent
return of 1.928 basis points (bp). This return predictive ability outperforms the other IOF
3
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2907612
measures we consider in the study, including the aggregate institutional order flow in An-
cerno data, Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwatzs’ estimate, and the estimate based on a
size cut-off rule following Lee and Radhakrishna (2000). We obtain the same conclusion in
direct horse race tests of multiple IOFs in the same return prediction model as well as in
investment analysis. These results suggest that combining TAQ and Ancerno data yields a
more accurate IOF estimate in the cross-section.
Because we can identify institution types in 13F and Ancerno, it is possible to apply
the same method to a subgroup of institutions such as: hedge funds, mutual funds, short-
term institutional investors, and active institutions. These types of institutions can differ
considerably on investment strategies, tools, and payoff structures. Therefore, looking at
institutional investors as a whole may discard important heterogeneity across institution
types. Taking advantage of estimation flexibility in our method, we choose to estimate and
examine institutional order flow from hedge funds and non-hedge funds as an example to
shed more light on the stock trading skills of institutional investors.
We investigate the systematic difference between aggregate hedge fund and non-hedge
fund trading in three ways: First, we conjecture that hedge funds execute their orders at
lower costs than non-hedge funds, hence generating smaller contemporaneous price impact
because hedge fund managers can time market liquidity (Cao, et al., 2013) and are likely
to provide liquidity (Jame, 2017). However, this hypothesis is not well supported by our
data. We find that hedge fund order flow is more balanced than non-hedge fund order
flow but it is more likely due to less trading demand from the smaller hedge fund sector.
Moreover, both types of institutions seem to have similar skills in managing trading costs as
the estimated price impact from institutional order imbalance is significantly smaller than
the overall market order imbalance. Between hedge funds and non-hedge funds, however, the
difference in contemporaneous price impact per unit of trade is not statistically significant.
Second, there is a well-documented performance difference in the literature examined
at monthly or quarterly horizons. The superior performance of hedge funds is persistent
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(Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov, 2010) and their confidential holdings exhibit posi-
tive performance for up to twelve months (Agarwal, et al., 2013 and Argon, Hertzel, and
Shi, 2013). To understand hedge funds’ investment skills better, we test if their trades con-
tain more informative about short-term future returns than trades from other institutions.
Indeed, in Fama-MacBeth regressions, we find that the hedge fund order flow generates a
coefficient of 1.603 with a t-statistic of 17.18 while the non-hedge fund order flow has a
slightly negative and insignificant coefficient when predicting the next day’s returns. More-
over, the pricing effect of hedge fund trades is permanent without subsequent reversals, while
the non-hedge fund trades generate significantly negative price impact over longer horizons.
This result is robust in several subsample tests based on firm size, bid-ask spread, time pe-
riods, and exchange markets. The investment strategies based on hedge fund order flow and
non-hedge fund order flow generate average daily return differentials of 0.082 (t-statistic =
10.95) and 0.043 (t-statistic = 5.95), respectively.
Finally, we examine how the two types of institutions respond to well-known return
anomalies. Akbas, et al. (2015), Kokkonen and Suominen (2015) show that fund flow into
hedge funds mitigates mispricing. However, direct within-month arbitrage trading activities
by hedge funds in response to predictable return anomalies are not documented in existing
studies. We construct a mispricing index updated every day, similar to the one used by
Stambaugh, Yu, Yuan (2012, 2015). In panel regressions of net IOFs on the lagged mispricing
index, we find that hedge fund trades are positively associated with the mispricing index from
the previous day, implying that they buy undervalued stocks and sell overvalued stocks. On
the contrary, the coefficient estimate of lagged mispricing is negative and significant when
we apply net non-hedge fund order flow as the dependent variable, suggesting that other
institutions, on average, trade in a direction that exacerbates return anomalies.
We make two contributions to the finance literature. First, we introduce a new method of
estimating institutional order flow for individual stocks at the daily level. Empirical analysis
shows that this new method has more robust and stronger performance in terms of return
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predictability than prior methods proposed by Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) and Campbell,
Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2009). Our method can be applied in empirical studies that
examine institutional trading behavior at the daily, or longer, frequency. The method is also
flexible to be applied to subgroups of institutions. Second, by investigating the contribution
of different types of funds to price discovery, we find that hedge funds have superior trading
skills in timing short-term future returns rather than contemporaneous market liquidity
compared to other institutional investors. We also find that hedge funds actively trade on
well-known stock return anomalies on a daily basis, while the other institutions, on average,
trade against those anomalies. These findings complement the studies using longer-horizon
observations such as Akbas, et al. (2015) and Caglayan, Celiker, and Sonaer (2018) by
providing direct evidence at a finer granularity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes our estimation method
of aggregate institutional order flow and sample selection. Section III tests the performance
of our IOF estimate. Section IV investigates the systematic difference between hedge fund
and non-hedge fund trading. Finally, Section V presents our conclusions..
II. Data and variable description
A. Sample selection
We merge four databases into our sample using eight-digit CUSIP and Monthly TAQ
master file: (1) daily CRSP data for stock return, share volume turnover ratio, relative bid-
ask spread, market capitalization, a primary exchange code, and share type code; (2) TAQ
data to calculate total order imbalance in different trade size bins; (3) Thomson Reuters 13F
Ownership data for quarterly holding of institutional investors; and (4) Ancerno institutional
trade data to calculate stock-day Ancerno order imbalance. The sample includes 10, 221, 329
stock-day observations from January 1999 to March 2012. Every observation in our sample
meets the following criteria to be eligible: (1) it is a common stock; (2) it is primarily listed
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on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq; (3) it is available in Monthly TAQ master file, 13F and CRSP;
(4) the relative close bid-ask spread is positive and less than one half; and (5) the stock price
is greater than $5. We winsorize all types of estimated institutional order flow measures,
relative bid-ask spread, and share volume turnover ratio at one and 99 percent levels in the
cross-section for each day.
B. Estimating institutional order flow
B.1. Cut-off rule from Lee and Radhakrishna (2000)
Many studies have identified individual and institutional trades using transaction size.
For example, Lee (1992) considers transactions less than $10, 000 to be initiated by individual
investors. More recently, Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) categorize individual and
institutional investors by using $20, 000 and $50, 000 thresholds. The cut-off rule is intuitively
appealing because institutional investors are more likely to be large investors who can buy
or sell a large amount of stocks in a single transaction. Lee and Radhakrisha (LR, 2000)
show that, according to TORQ data for 144 NYSE stocks from November 1990 to January
1991, the cut-off rule effectively separates institutional trades from individual trades. Also,
Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003) report that institutional trades consist of 85.99% of
block trades (more than 10, 000 shares in a transaction) and 18.14% of small trades (less
than 500 shares in a transaction) in a hundred of Nasdaq stocks from May 2000 to February
2001. However, the cut-off rule is subject to a misclassification concern rooted in order
splits by institutional investors. Using the TORQ data, LR disprove it by showing that
94% of total orders are executed in a single transaction. When it comes to more recent
periods, however, Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwatz (2009) find that institutional trades
significantly involve small- sized trades (less than $2, 000 in a transaction) for small firms,
using quarterly institutional holding and TAQ data from 1993 to 2000. In addition, Cready,
Kumas, and Subasi (2014) document that the majority of institutional trades are small-
sized trades (less than 500 shares in a transaction) in Ancerno institutional data from 2003
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to 2010. These empirical findings challenge the accuracy of the cut-off rule.
To construct a benchmark IOF measure following LR, we apply a $5, 000 cut-off rule
to identify institutional trades in TAQ data from January 1999 to March 2012.3 First, we
determine trade directions using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.4 We put a posi-
tive (negative) sign on a buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) transaction. Then, we categorize
transactions greater than $5, 000 as institutional trades. Lastly, we aggregate the number of
signed shares of institutional trades at stock-day level and divide by the number of shares
outstanding for cross-sectional normalization to produce an estimated institutional order
imbalance, LR.
B.2. Institutional order flow from Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwatz (2009)
Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwatz (2009) develop a non-linear model to estimate in-
stitutional order flow at daily frequency, extrapolated from the quarterly relation of insti-
tutional ownership change in 13F and order imbalances in different trade sizes from TAQ.
They highlight two advantages of the method in comparison to the cut-off rule. One is that
it exploits information on net order flow in the full range of transaction sizes, rather than
based on a single threshold, to account for the fact that institutional investors can split
orders either to hide their trades or to reduce transaction costs. Another advantage is that
their method allows size-categorized order imbalance to be positively or negatively associated
with an institutional ownership change because institutions can strategically choose to take
or provide liquidity, depending on the size of the trades. For example, an institution can
submit several small-sized limit orders. In this case, order flow in the small-sized transaction
would be negatively associated with the change of institutional ownership.
3LR show that the $5,000 cut-off can capture 82% of institutional trades, the highest percentage among
their chosen cut-offs. Using alternative thresholds does not alter our conclusion about the effectiveness of
the cut-off rule. These results are available upon request.
4Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm classifies a trade as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) if its execution
price is higher (lower) than a mid-point of National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) prices. If the execution
price is the same as the mid-point, the trade is classified as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) if the execution
price is higher (lower) than the previous trade price.
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The estimation is based on the following equation:
∆Yi,q = αq + ρ∆Yi,q−1 +φYi,q−1 +βUUi,q +βUY Yi,q−1×Ui,q +
19∑
Z=1
β(Z, Yi,q−1)FZ,i,q + i,q, (1)
where for a stock i in a quarter q, α is a set of four quarter dummies, Y is aggregate
institutional ownership in 13F, U is aggregate unclassified trades scaled by shares outstanding
for which the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm cannot determine the direction, and FZ is
aggregate order imbalance scaled by shares outstanding in a trade-size bin Z. CRS assign
trades into nineteen size bins which have lower limit points at $0, $2, 000, $3, 000, $5, 000,
$7, 000, $9, 000, $10, 000, $20, 000, $30, 000, $50, 000, $70, 000, $90, 000, $100, 000, $200, 000,
$300, 000, $500, 000, $700, 000, $900, 000, and $1 million. Since large trades for a small stock
are rare, the coefficients on order flow in large trade sizes are likely swung by the small
number of unusual trades. To address the potential issue in estimation, CRS borrow a yield
curve model for β(Z, Yi,q−1) from Nelson and Siegel (NS, 1987):
β(Z, Yi,q−1) = b01+b02Yi,q−1+(b11+b12Yi,q−1+b21+b22Yi,q−1)[1−e−Z/τ ] τ
Z
−(b21+b22Yi,q−1)e−Z/τ ,
(2)
where τ is a constant to be estimated. The NS model smooths out the coefficient variation
across transaction size by putting less weight on order flow in larger trade-size bins. Also,
CRS divide the sample into quintile portfolios based on NYSE breakpoints of market capi-
talization at the start of each quarter, and estimate the coefficients in Equation (1) for each
quintile separately using non-linear least squares estimation that maximizes the adjusted
R-squared over different values of τ .5
Next, taking the estimates from Equation (1), CRS calculate the expected change of
5There could be a convergence problem in the estimation of Equation (1). For example, we have observed
the adjusted R-squared asymptotically approaching to its maximum as τ increases. For such cases when τ
approaches infinity, we set the arbitrary maximum value of τ to 100, 000.
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institutional ownership, E[∆Yi,d], as institutional order flow on a day.
∆Yi,d = αd + ρ∆Yi,q−1 +φYi,q−1 +βUUi,d +βUY Yi,q−1×Ui,d +
19∑
Z=1
β(Z, Yi,q−1)FZ,i,d + i,d, (3)
where d indexes a day. The frequency conversion is possible under an exogeneity assumption
that the error terms, i,d, are not correlated with all of its lead and lag terms within a
quarter. Also, CRS set to zero the quarterly variables such as ρ and φ as well as a set of
daily dummies, αd, because intra-quarter events may invalidate the exogeneity assumption.
B.3. Institutional order flow from Ancerno institutional trading data
Ancerno (AN) institution data is transaction-level institutional trading data provided by
Abel Noser Solutions, formerly Ancerno, Ltd., which offers consulting services for execution
as well as transaction cost analyses to institutional asset owners, investment managers, and
brokers. A material advantage to using AN is that it contains comprehensive records of an
institution’s trading history since that institution started to employ Abel Noser’s consult-
ing services. The data contain a client manager/broker/trader code, a trade date, CUSIP
of a traded stock, a trade direction, an execution price, the number of execution shares,
commissions, and fees for each trade6. However, AN has a sample bias because it covers a
limited portion of institutional trades. Puckett and Yan (2011) estimate that the data fail
to account for approximately 90% of total institutional trades. We also find that the time-
series correlation of total 13F institutional ownership changes with the aggregate Ancerno
institutional order flow is 0.249 at quarterly frequency for our sample period from January
1999 to March 2012. Those statistics cast doubt on whether AN trades sufficiently represent
the entire set of institutional trades on its own.
As an alternative IOF measure, we calculate the imbalance in Ancerno trades. Specifi-
cally, we calculate the difference between buyer execution shares and seller execution shares
6For more detailed information, see Puckett and Yan (2011), Anand, et al. (2012), Busse, Clifton, and
Jegadeesh (2012), Cready, Kumas, and Subasi (2014), Chakrabarty, Moulton, and Trzcinka (2017), Henry
and Koski (2017), or Jame (2017).
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in Ancerno for a stock on the same day scaled by number of shares outstanding, termed AN .
Note that Ancerno does not keep stock-day records for zero volume from their clients. We
set the AN volume on such stock-day observations to missing.7
B.4. Our proposed institutional order flow
We estimate institutional order flow in the same spirit as CRS. Exploiting the quarterly
association of an institutional ownership change with TAQ order flow as well as AN insti-
tutional order flow, we fit their relation to retrieve the institutional ownership change on
a daily basis. The utilization of AN institutional order flow has a non-trivial impact on
our estimation. The actual institutional order flow allows us to reduce potential measure-
ment errors in CRS estimation stemming from noisy TAQ order flow that groups together
individual and institutional trades.
We use non-linear least square fit over different values of τ to evaluate the coefficients in
the following model:
∆Yi,q = αq + ρ∆Yi,q−1 + φYi,q−1 + βUUi,q + βUY Yi,q−1 × Ui,q
+
19∑
Z=1
βF (Z, Yi,q−1)FZ,i,q +
19∑
Z=1
βD(Z, Yi,q−1)DZ,i,q + i,q, (4)
where DZ,i,q is aggregate AN institutional order imbalance calculated as the difference of
buyer execution shares and seller execution shares in a transaction size bin Z for a stock
i at a quarter q and other variables are the same as in Equation (1). βF (Z, Yi,q−1) and
βD(Z, Yi,q−1) have the same functional form as β(Z, Yi,q−1) in Equation (2). We also use the
same nineteen size bins as CRS, and estimate Equation (4) in each size quintile based on
NYSE breakpoints separately.
Then, we recover the expected institutional ownership change, E[∆Yi,d], on a daily basis,
7We also do the same test, setting the value of such zero-volume observations to zero. The test results
are qualitatively the same as those reported in this paper.
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by fitting the estimates of Equation (4) into the following equation:
∆Yi,d = αd + ρ∆Yi,q−1 + φYi,q−1 + βUUi,d + βUY Yi,q−1 × Ui,d
+
19∑
Z=1
βF (Z, Yi,q−1)FZ,i,d +
19∑
Z=1
βD(Z, Yi,q−1)DZ,i,d + i,d. (5)
The estimated daily change of institutional ownership is termed HH.
B.5. Hedge fund and non-hedge fund order flow
We estimate two institutional order flows for hedge funds and non-hedge funds to explore
the heterogenous trading behavior among institutions. Our estimation is, by construction,
flexible enough to measure the expected institutional order flow for different types of insti-
tutional investors: One can evaluate institutional order flow for any type of institution by
putting quarterly ownership of a target institution group in the estimation model of Equation
(4). In this paper, we choose hedge funds and non-hedge funds as an example.
We replicate the estimation of Equation (4) to get coefficients regarding hedge funds
and non-hedge funds, replacing the aggregate institutional ownership with aggregate hedge
fund ownership and non-hedge fund ownership, respectively.8 Then, we fit the estimates of
Equation (4) into the retrieval procedure in Equation (5) to measure the ownership change
of hedge funds and non-hedge funds at daily frequency as hedge fund order flow (HHHF )
and non-hedge fund order flow (HHNHF ), respectively.
C. Control variables
We calculate total order imbalance (TOI), share volume turnover ratio (TURN) and
relative bid-ask spread (SPRD) for a stock on a day as control variables in return prediction
regressions. The detailed definitions are the following:
8We thank Yuehua Tang for providing an identifier for hedge funds in Thomson Reuters 13F Ownership
data used in Agarwal, et al. (2013).
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• TOI: The number of buyer-initiated shares minus the number of seller-initiated shares
in TAQ based on the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm, scaled by the number of shares
outstanding in CRSP.
• TURN : Daily trading volume over the number of shares outstanding.
• SPRD: The difference between the bid and ask prices scaled by the average of bid
and ask prices.
We use the risk-adjusted mid quote stock return (RET ) with respect to the Fama-French
(2015) five factors as our measure of stock return.
D. Summary statistics
Panel A of Table I presents the time-series average of cross-sectional statistics for insti-
tutional order flow (IOF) measures and control variables. Our sample covers, on average,
3, 073.2 stocks per trading day for 3, 326 trading days from January 1999 to March 2012.
[Place Table I about here]
First, and for purposes of comparison, four versions of IOF measures are reported. Our
proposed IOF (HH) has a mean of 0.025, which is five times its median of 0.005. HH has
a standard deviation of 0.158 and is positively skewed with a minimum of −0.535 and a
maximum of 0.671. AN is well-balanced as the mean and median are close to zero at 0.004
and 0.002, respectively. The average number of observations per day for AN is 2, 043.1 due
to limited coverage of AN data. CRS has a mean of 0.024 similar to HH, but a smaller
standard deviation of 0.074. LR has a mean of 0.014, smaller than HH.
Statistics for hedge and non-hedge IOFs are reported next. The average numbers of
observations per day for HHHF and HHNHF are 2, 893.5 and 3, 071.6, respectively. HHHF
has a mean of 0.006 and a standard deviation of 0.020, both smaller than those of HHNHF
(mean = 0.019; standard deviation = 0.121). The result is consistent with the fact that the
13
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average ownership of hedge funds (9.30%) is about one-third of non-hedge funds (30.00%)
in our sample period.
Lastly, descriptive statistics for control variables are presented. Total order imbalance
(TOI) has very similar statistics to LR: a mean of 0.015 and a standard deviation of 0.179.
The mean bid-ask spread (SPRD) is 0.009 and the mean turnover ratio (TURN) is 0.649.
The mean and median of risk-adjusted mid-quote return are 0.000 and 0.027, respectively.
Panel B of Table I presents the time-series average of cross-sectional correlation between
estimated IOFs and control variables. Although we use both TAQ and AN order imbalances
to estimate HH under the same dependence structure, the loadings of HH on TAQ and AN
data seem to differ considerably. The correlation between HH and AN is 0.875, almost seven
times the correlation between HH and TOI at 0.127. This average daily correlation of 0.875
is also much higher than the quarterly correlation between aggregate AN institutional order
flow and 13F ownership change at 0.249. The quarterly correlation between aggregate TAQ
order imbalance and 13F ownership change is 0.099. HH’s correlations with CRS and LR are
0.352 and 0.142, respectively. Therefore, we find significant impact of including the AN data
in our estimation of institutional order flow. The resulting HH is sufficiently different from
the existing IOF estimates. In addition, non-hedge fund IOF (HHNHF ) behaves similarly
to HH with a high correlation of 0.957 between the two, because non-hedge funds make up
the majority of the investment industry and also because 63.8 percent of their trades are
correlated with hedge funds’ trades.
We also find AN institutional order flow is weakly correlated with CRS, LR, and TOI.
The correlation of CRS with LR is 0.306, similar to its correlation with TOI as LR and
TOI are almost identical with a correlation coefficient of 0.946. All estimated institutional
order flows except AN are positively associated with stock liquidity. For example, HH is
negatively (positively) associated with relative bid-ask spread (share volume turnover ratio)
with a correlation of −0.052 (0.148). AN is independent of stock liquidity. Additionally,
IOF measures make a positive impact on the contemporaneous price. In particular, CRS
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has the weakest influence on the current stock price with a correlation of 0.069.
Interestingly, correlation tests suggest that hedge funds are more sensitive to liquidity and
their trades make weaker contemporaneous price impact than non-hedge funds. Specifically,
the correlation of hedge funds’ order flow is significantly more negative (positive) with relative
bid-ask spread (share volume turnover ratio) than the correlation of non-hedge funds’ order
flow. The difference is −0.011 (0.128) with a t-statistic of −22.27 (106.77). The correlations
of HHHF and HHNHF with contemporaneous return are 0.088 and 0.119, respectively. The
difference in the correlations is −0.030 with a t-statistic of −45.83. We will dive deeper into
the impact of hedge fund order flow on contemporaneous prices in Section IV.A.
III. Performance of institutional order flows
We compare our proposed institutional order flow HH with the other IOF estimates
in this section. As the total institutional order flow is not observable on a daily basis, we
evaluate the effectiveness of different IOF measures by testing a joint hypothesis that a more
accurate IOF is more informative about future stock prices in the cross-section. Institutional
trading can contain price information for the following reasons: First, many institutions, as
large shareholders, have direct communication with firms. Therefore, they can ask firms
to disclose more information for monitoring purposes (Boone and White, 2015). Second,
they maintain good relationships with sell-side analysts - a relationship that allows insti-
tutions to receive additional tips on a particular stock from analysts (Irvine, Lipson, and
Puckett, 2007). Third, they are capable of correctly interpreting financial information, such
as earnings. Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002) find evidence that institutions trade
in the profitable direction following earnings news. Additionally, Piotroski and Roulstone
(2004) and Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2009) show that institutions can anticipate
future earnings surprises. Market microstructure studies largely confirm the role of institu-
tional trading in price discovery. For example, Hendershott, Livan, and Schurhoff (2015)
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find that institutional trading enhances price efficiency by spreading information prior to a
news announcement. Boehmer and Kelly (2009) also find that stocks with high institutional
ownership have more efficient prices. Based on the premise that institutional trading con-
veys price information, we examine the predictive power of different measures of IOF in the
following subsection. We also compare the performance of investment strategies based on
different IOFs in the subsequent subsection.
A. Cross-sectional return prediction
We begin our return prediction analysis with Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions in our
sample consisting of all common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq between Jan-
uary 1999 and March 2012. Table II reports the estimated coefficients of the following
model:
Ri,t = αt +
5∑
k=1
βIt,kIOFi,t−k +
5∑
k=1
βTt,kTOIi,t−k
+ γBt SPRDi,t−1 + γ
T
t TURNi,t−1 +
5∑
k=1
γRt,kRi,t−k + i,t,
where for stock i on day t, R is risk-adjusted mid-quote stock return with respect to Fama-
French (2015) five factors; IOF is an institutional order flow measure including HH, AN ,
CRS, and LR. We include lagged TOI in the model to control for the aggregate market order
imbalance. Also, lagged relative bid-ask spread (SPRD) and lagged share volume turnover
ratio (TURN) control for liquidity effects in the model, and lagged returns are included to
control for return reversals. To account for serial correlations, we use Newey-West (1987)
standard errors with eight lags to calculate the t-statistics.
[Place Table II about here]
The first column shows that the coefficient of HH is 0.122 at the first lag with a t-
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statistic of 11.71. In terms of economic significance, a one-standard deviation increase of
HH is associated with an increase of 1.928 basis point (bp) in the next day’s stock return.
However, this large price impact gradually reverses in subsequent days as the coefficients
at longer lags are all negative and significant. After five days, the positive initial price
impact completely dies out. In the second column, the number of observations decreases
from 10, 015, 095 to 5, 033, 554 because the AN data do not fully cover all the stock-day
observations in our sample. Similar to HH, AN also has a positive coefficient (0.097, t-
statistic = 6.39) at the first lag. The economic significance of AN is weaker than HH as a
one-standard deviation increase in AN is associated with an increase of 1.329 bp in stock
return on the next day. The coefficients of AN also turn negative at longer lags, though only
marginally significant, indicating that the price impact from AN lasts for more than a week.
In the third column, CRS has significantly negative coefficients at all lags, indicating this
IOF measure captures price pressure but not information content in the cross-section.9 The
last column shows that the first lagged term of LR has significantly negative price impact,
but it flips to a positive sign in the second lag. The other lags are statistically indifferent
from zero.
All the control variables other than total order imbalance have the expected signs of
their coefficients. Total order flow has mixed signs in the first lagged term across columns
with longer lags always having negative and significant coefficients. Spread and turnover
ratio both have positive and significant coefficients, consistent with Amihud and Mendelson
(1986) and Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001), respectively. We also observe significant
return reversals in all regressions.
The results in Table II suggest that HH is a powerful predictor for stock return. Focusing
on the price impact on the next day only, HH outperforms the other IOF estimates in both
statistical and economic significance. The strong predictive power of HH indicates that
9In unreported tests, we find that CRS positively predicts future returns on the following day in regres-
sions without the control variables. We have also achieved similar results in CRS (2009) using the same
vector auto-regression specification.
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AN institutional trades significantly complements the TAQ data in extracting valuable price
information. However, the pricing effect from HH turns negative at longer horizons while
AN does not in a restricted sample. To compare the performance of HH with other IOF
measures in fair tests, we conduct additional regression analysis by using HH and another
IOF estimate in the same regression and report results in Table III. For brevity, we present
the estimated coefficients of institutional order flow only, while the regressions always include
the full set of control variables.
[Place Table III about here]
The first column presents the horse race result between HH and AN . In the same
restricted sample, HH has a coefficient of 0.073 with a t-statistic of 3.24 at the first lag
and the subsequent reversals also become smaller in magnitude compared to the result in
Table II. AN , however, fails to retain coefficients significantly different from zero at any lag
in the horse race. It seems the predictive ability of AN is subsumed by HH. In the second
and third columns, the coefficients of HH remain positive and significant at the first lag
while CRS and LR yield only negative and significant coefficients, similar to those in Table
II.
In summary, the predictive power of our proposed IOF estimate, HH, outperforms the
other IOF estimates in the cross-section. The estimated coefficient of HH is always positive
and significant at the first lag, regardless of inclusion of competing institutional order flow.
Note that the pricing effect of HH is not persistent and reverses in the four subsequent
trading days. This IOF behavior implies institutions are likely to rely on short-lived infor-
mation for their trades as a whole. AN institutional order flow is also positively associated
with stock return on the following day and its price impact is persistent at least for five
trading days. When it comes to the horse race with HH in Table III, however, AN loses its
predictive ability for stock returns. CRS and LR only generate a negative price impact on
future stock returns in the regression, controlling for stock illiquidity and return reversals. If
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institutional investors are better informed than an average investor, their order flow should
positively correlate with future stock returns. Consistent with this view, we find that HH
generates persistent and robust return predictive ability for returns, while the other IOF
measures do not.
B. Investment analysis
In this subsection, we perform univariate sorts to examine the profitability of order flow
strategies. We sort all stocks into decile portfolios based on one of the IOF measures each
day and calculate the average equal-weighted portfolio returns on the following day. Table IV
reports the average decile portfolio returns as well as the return differentials and Fama-French
(2015) alphas between the top and bottom order imbalance decile portfolios. All t-statistics
in Table IV are calculated based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors with eight lags.
[Place Table IV about here]
We find that the investment strategy of buying stocks in the top HH decile and selling
stocks in the bottom decile generates an average return of 5.2 bp on the following day with
a t-statistic of 6.81. The alpha with respect to the Fama-French (2015) five factors (FF5)
is at the same magnitude with an even larger t-statistic. The long-short strategy based on
AN also produces a significantly positive average return of 5.9 bp on the next day with a
t-statistic of 6.96.10 Strategies based on CRS and LR, however, do not generate positive
abnormal returns. In the case of CRS, the return differential is even significantly negative.
The univariate portfolio sort results in this subsection are consistent with Fama- MacBeth
regression results in the previous subsection. While the profitability analysis sheds light on
the information content of order flows, such investment strategies may not be implementable
in practice because the IOF model parameters are estimated using the full sample data.
10The performance difference between the HH-based and AN -based strategies is −0.007 with a t-statistic
of −1.10, statistically indifferent from zero. Note that there is difference in sample sizes: 10, 221, 329 for
HH, CRS, and LR versus 6, 790, 481 for AN .
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IV. Trading behavior of hedge/non-hedge funds
One advantage of our IOF estimation method is its flexibility to estimate order flow
for different types of institutions. As an example, we study potential heterogenous trading
behavior between hedge funds and other institutional investors in this section. Specifically,
we examine the following three aspects in stock trading:
1. Execution cost:
We conjecture that hedge funds execute their orders at low costs. Aragon and Strahan
(2012) find that a hedge fund investor can act as a liquidity provider per Lehman’s
bankruptcy in 2008. Cao, et al. (2013) also find evidence that hedge funds can time
market liquidity. The direct comparison of execution costs between hedge funds and
other institutions in a large cross-section is still absent in finance literature due to
unobservable order flow. To undertake this task, we examine the contemporaneous
price impact of hedge fund and non-hedge fund order flow estimates, constructed using
our method.
2. Informed trading:
We expect that institutional order flow from a hedge fund is more informative about
future stock price. Prior studies using observations at low frequencies also support this
view. For example, Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010) find persistency of
superior performance in hedge funds after mitigating a self-reporting concern in hedge
fund databases. Agarwal, et al. (2013) and Argon, Hertzel, and Shi (2013) report
positive and significant abnormal returns from the 13F confidential holdings of hedge
funds. More recently, Cao, et al. (2017) provide evidence that stocks bought by hedge
funds subsequently improve in price efficiency. However, analysis at a daily frequency
using hedge fund order flow in a large cross-section is scarce. To fill the gap in the
literature, we investigate the return predictability of hedge fund order flow and non-
hedge fund order flow in: 1) cross-sectional regressions replicating Table II; and 2) an
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investment analysis replicating Table IV.
3. Arbitrage trading:
We conjecture that hedge funds trade on mispriced stocks. Akbas, et al. (2015)
and Kokkonen and Suominen (2015) find a positive relation between monthly flow to
hedge funds and return spread between under-valued and over-valued stock portfolios,
suggesting that hedge fund flow attenuates market mispricing. Taking advantage of the
finer granularity of our estimated hedge fund IOF, we conduct a stock-level analysis
on arbitrage trading by hedge funds and other institutions at a daily frequency.
A. Trading cost management
In this subsection, we compare the trading costs associated with hedge fund order flow
(HHHF ) versus non-hedge fund order flow (HHNHF ) in the same sample of common stocks
on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq between January 1999 an March 2012. If institutions actively
time market liquidity or provide liquidity in execution, their order imbalance can generate a
relatively smaller contemporaneous price impact. We test the trading skills of hedge funds
and non-hedge funds in Table V, which presents the estimated coefficients of the following
model:
Ri,t = αt + β
HF
t HH
HF
i,t + β
NHF
t HH
NHF
i,t
+ βTt TOIi,t + γ
B
t SPRDi,t−1 + γ
T
t TURNi,t−1 +
5∑
k=1
γRt,kRi,t−k + i,t,
where HHHF and HHNHF are hedge fund order flow and non-hedge fund order flow, re-
spectively, and the other variables are the same as defined in Table I.
In univariate regressions, we find that both hedge fund and non-hedge fund IOFs have
large and significant contemporaneous price pressure. Specifically, the coefficient of HHHF
is 11.142 with a t-statistic of 50.44 in Column (1). HHNHF has a coefficient of 2.636 with
a t-statistics of 60.89 in Column (2). In Column (3), we include both HHHF and HHNHF
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in the same regression model. The multivariate regression results show that the coefficient
of HHHF decreases to 2.043 with a much smaller t-statistic of 5.53, but the coefficient of
HHNHF remains at the same magnitude with a t-statistic of 38.23. The difference between
the two coefficients is 0.32. However, this number is not statistically different from zero.
The price pressure further decreases in Column (4) when we include TAQ order imbalance,
illiquidity, and lagged returns in the regression, but the result is qualitatively the same to
Column (3). We find the order imbalances of both hedge funds and non-hedge funds gen-
erate positive contemporaneous price impact in the market. Although the hedge fund price
impact is smaller than that of non-hedge funds, the difference is not statistically significant.
Interestingly, the coefficient on the total market order imbalance, TOI, is much larger (4.403,
t-statistic = 90.02) than those of the two institutional order imbalances, suggesting that in-
stitutions in general can have better skills in managing contemporaneous price impact. The
results in this subsection suggest weak evidence, if any, that hedge funds manage trading
costs better than their non-hedge fund counterparts at the aggregate level. It is possible
that the liquidity timing skills documented by Aragon and Strahan (2012) and Cao et al.
(2013) are not be limited to hedge funds only.
B. Cross-sectional return prediction
In this subsection, we turn to return predictability of hedge fund and non-hedge fund
trades. We replicate the regression analysis in Table II. For brevity, Table VI report the
coefficient estimates of order flow only, while the regressions always include the full set of
control variables.
[Place Table VI about here]
In Column (1), we examine the information content of hedge fund order flow first. The
estimated coefficient is 1.508 at the first lag with a t-statistic of 18.49. Similar to the total
institutional order flow, HHHF also experiences significant reversal in its pricing effect on
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subsequent days as the coefficient estimates become negative and significant on days t − 3
to t − 5. However, even after five days, the cumulative price impact is still positive and
significant. In Column (2), we find that non-hedge fund order flow also has predictive power
for stock returns on the subsequent day with a coefficient of 0.139 and a t-statistic of 10.25.
However, the pricing effect of non-hedge fund trades is only transitory, similar to the HH
price impact in Table II. This is not surprising given the high correlation between HH and
HHNHF . When we use both HHHF and HHNHF in the same regression in Column (3),
we find that the discrepancies are enhanced. Specifically, HHHF obtains similar predictive
ability at the first lag without significant reversals later, while HHNHF loses its initial
positive price impact with almost the same negative pricing effects at longer horizons.11
These results indicate that hedge fund trades have permanent price impact while non-hedge
fund trades have transitory price pressure only, supporting our conjecture that hedge funds
have an information advantage over other institutions.
Next, we investigate the predictive power of HHHF and HHNHF in subsamples of stocks
as a robustness test. In Table VII, we begin by conditioning based on firm size in the first
three columns. We sort all stocks into tertile portfolios based on daily market capitalization
and report the estimated coefficients of institutional net order flows from our base regression
model for each portfolio. The control variables are included in the regressions, but omitted
in reporting for brevity. The results can be summarized as follows: First, focusing on the
pricing effect on the subsequent day, HHHF has positive and significant coefficient estimates
in all three firm groups, while HHNHF only has significant pricing effects for the middle-
sized firm group. Second, HHHF ’s pricing effect on the subsequent day adversely depends
on the firm size for both statistical and economic significance. Specifically, HHHF has a
coefficient of 4.260 (t-statistic = 16.60) for small stocks and 0.719 (t-statistic = 5.53) for
large stocks. In terms of economic significance, a one-standard deviation increase in HHHF
leads to an increase of 7.25 bp in the next day’s stock return for small stocks and 1.38 bp
11Increasing the number of lagged IOF generates similar results in this test.
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for large stocks. Third, the pricing effect of HHHF is permanent in all three groups, with a
small reversal in the small firm group, no reversal in the median group, and a continuation
of positive effects in the large firm group over subsequent days.
[Place Table VII about here]
In the next three columns, we examine subsamples of stocks based on liquidity measured
by the relative bid-ask spread. We find the following results: First, HHHF has positive and
significant coefficient estimates at the first lag in all three spread groups, while HHNHF only
generates insignificant or negative price impact at the first lag in all stock groups. Second,
hedge fund’s pricing effects are stronger for stocks with wide spreads. For example, the
coefficient estimate of HHHF is 3.110 (t-statistic = 13.79) for stocks with wide spreads and
0.834 (t-statistic = 6.59) for stocks with narrow spreads. A one-standard deviation increase
in HHHF is associated with an increase in the subsequent return by 6.50 bp for stocks with
wide spreads and by only 1.37 bp for those with narrow spreads. The difference between the
spread groups is consistent with the notion that stocks with wide spreads are less transparent
because of higher arbitrage costs.
We then break the sample into an early period from 1999 to 2004, and a late period
from 2005 to 2012 to investigate the time-series variation in return predictability. We report
estimated coefficients in the subsequent two columns for these subperiods. HHHF positively
and significantly predicts the next day’s return in both subperiods. The coefficient of HHHF
at the first lag slightly reduces from 1.742 (t-statistic = 10.64) in the early period to 1.488
(t-statistic = 14.44) in the late period. The coefficients suggest that a one-standard deviation
increase of HHHF leads to a return increase of 3.54 bp in the early period and 2.91 bp in the
late period. At the second lag, HHHF shifts from a positive and significant pricing effect in
the early period to a mild reversal in the late period. HHNHF has insignificant coefficient
estimates in both periods. The difference between two subperiods is consistent with the idea
that liquidity improvement is accompanied by the rise of high frequency trading that, in
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turn increases price efficiency over time12.
Finally, we separate the sample according to the primary stock exchange in the last two
columns. Because the Nasdaq market is traditionally a dealers’ market and has a different
market structure from NYSE and AMEX, we examine Nasdaq listed and non-Nasdaq listed
stocks separately. The results show that HHHF has positive and significant predictive ability
in both Nasdaq and non-Nasdaq subsamples, while the coefficient of HHNHF is negative
and significant in the non-Nasdaq subsample and insignificant in the Nasdaq subsample.
Specifically, HHHF has a coefficient of 1.718 with a t-statistic of 9.24 for NYSE and AMEX
stocks, and a coefficient of 1.956 with a t-statistic of 14.91 for Nasdaq stocks.
Given the strong return predictive ability from HHHF , we analyze investment strategies
based on lagged HHHF and HHNHF . Replicating Table IV, we sort all stocks into decile
portfolios based on IOF measures for hedge funds and non-hedge funds every day and cal-
culate the average equal-weighted portfolio returns on the next day. Table VIII reports the
average decile portfolio returns as well as the return differentials and Fama-French (2015)
alphas between the top and bottom order imbalance decile portfolios.
[Place Table VIII about here]
We find that both strategies based on hedge fund and non-hedge fund trades generate
positive and significant abnormal returns on the following day. The HHHF strategy produces
a positive alpha of 8 bp with a t-statistic of 11.04. Similarly, the HHNHF strategy also
generates a positive and significant alpha of 4.2 bp (t-statistic = 6.00), much lower than
the HHHF strategy. These alphas should be interpreted with caution again because the
parameter estimation utilizes the full sample analyzed.
The results in this subsection are summarized into three findings: First, hedge fund trades
can predict stock returns on the subsequent day and make a permanent price impact. Second,
the return predictability of hedge funds outperforms other institutions. Lastly, the superior
power of return prediction is robust in diverse subsamples. Such findings also suggest that
12See Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveid (2011) and Broggard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014).
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hedge funds may capture fundamental information and exploit their information advantage
in trading.
C. Arbitrage trading
In this subsection, we study how institutions exploit well-known arbitrage opportunities
documented in the literature. We construct a mispricing index, similar to Stambaugh, Yu,
Yuan (2012, 2015), that is updated daily. We identify mispricing based on the following nine
return anomalies with detailed calculation methods in the Appendix.
1. Net stock issues as in Ritter (1991) and Loughram and Ritter (1995)
2. Composite equity issues as in Daniel and Titman (2006)
3. Total accruals as in Sloan (1996)
4. Net operating assets as in Hirshleifer, et al. (2004)
5. Momentum as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
6. Gross profitability as in Novy-Marx (2013)
7. Asset growth as in Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008)
8. Return on assets as in Fama and French (2006) and Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang
(2011)
9. Investment-to-asset ratio as in Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004)
Using daily CRSP-Compustat merged data from January 1999 to March 2012, we update
accounting-based anomalies on the reporting date. To construct the mispricing index, we
first rank all stocks into decile portfolios from over-valued stocks to under-valued stocks based
on each anomaly factor each day. Then, we assign the portfolio rank to every stock in that
portfolio as an index for that particular anomaly. Therefore, stocks with higher mispricing
index values are more likely to be under-valued. We take the average of the ranks of the nine
anomaly signals as the mispricing index for a stock on a particular day. We only consider
stock-day observations for which at least five anomaly factors can be calculated. Consistent
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with the anomaly literature, we examine only common stocks with prices above $5 on NYSE,
AMEX, and Nasdaq markets and exclude all stocks in financial and utility industries. After
merging the anomaly index into our main sample, we have 1, 800, 557 stock-day observations.
We examine arbitrage trading of hedge funds and non-hedge funds using a panel regres-
sion. If institutional investors exploit arbitrage opportunities implied by these anomalies,
their order flow should be positively associated with the mispricing index. Table IX report
the least squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimates which remove firm fixed effects in the
following model:
OFi,t = βMISPi,t−1 + γFFirstWeeki,t−1 + γLLastWeeki,t−1
+ γFXFirstWeeki,t−1 ×MISPi,t−1 + γLXLastWeeki,t−1 ×MISPi,t−1 + i,t,
where for each firm i on day t, OF is the estimated institutional order flow as indicated
on the top of each column, FirstWeek (LastWeek) is a dummy variable for days in the first
(last) week in a month, and MISP is the mispricing index we compose.
[Place Table IX about here]
In the univariate regression of HHHF on lagged mispricing index, we find that the coef-
ficient estimate of the mispricing index is 0.833 with a t-statistic of 4.34. When we include
the week dummies and their interactions with the mispricing index, we find the association
between HHHF and MISP remains positive and significant. Moreover, unconditionally,
hedge funds seem more likely to purchase stocks in the first week of a month and sell stocks
in the last week of a month given the significant coefficient estimates of 0.049 and −0.110 on
the two week dummies, respectively. We also find the hedge fund purchase at the beginning
of a month is not likely to be motivated by mispricing as the interaction of MISP and
the first-week dummy has a negative and significant coefficient estimate, fully offsetting the
positive coefficient on MISP .
Turning to non-hedge funds, on the other hand, we find that MISP has a coefficient of
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−4.315 with a t-statistic of −3.74. This negative relation is also robust in the multivariate
regression with week dummies. Interestingly, although the impact of MISP is completely
the opposite for HHHF and HHNHF , the seasonality of order flow is similar for both types
of funds. HHNHF also becomes significantly more positive in the first week and significantly
more negative in the last week of a month.
The results in this table suggest that hedge fund managers trade on asset pricing anoma-
lies on a daily basis. However, the non-hedge fund institutions trade in the opposite way,
potentially exacerbating anomalies despite well-documented patterns of abnormal returns
from such trading strategies.
V. Conclusion
In this article, we propose a new method to estimate net institutional order flow (IOF)
that extrapolates the quarterly relation between institutional ownership change and quarterly
order flow information from TAQ and Ancerno to a higher frequency–daily in our case. We
test the performance of our estimated IOF estimate, termed HH, by comparing its return
predictive ability to three other IOF measures for common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX,
and Nasdaq markets from January 1999 to March 2012. The alternative IOF methods
include: the size cut-off rule as in Lee and Radhakrisha (LR, 2000); Campbell, Ramadorai,
and Schwartz’s (CRS, 2009) method, which is similar to ours, but uses only the TAQ
order imbalance; and the aggregate imbalance in Ancerno data (AN). We find that HH
outperforms the other IOF measures in predicting future stock returns in the cross-section.
The superior performance of HH comes from the fact that we utilize the trade information
made available in both TAQ and Ancerno. The CRS method relies exclusively on the
heterogeneity of institutional trading patterns across trade sizes that can be discerned using
TAQ data. Though TAQ records all transactions on public exchanges, the measurement
error in trader identity is enormous. Ancerno, on the other hand, provides cleanly identified
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institutional trade records, while its coverage is rather limited. Combining these two data
sources, we construct a more informative measure of institutional order flow than presented
previous studies.
Our estimation method can also be applied to net order flow estimation for particular
types of institutions. As an example, we investigate trading skills of hedge fund and non-
hedge fund investors, as such direct empirical comparison at a relatively high frequency in a
large cross-section is still absent from the literature. Our results indicate that hedge funds
have superior trading skills as opposed to non-hedge fund institutions. Specifically, hedge
fund trades are more informative about future stock prices with a positive and permanent
impact, while non-hedge fund trades exhibit only transitory price pressure. Moreover, we find
that hedge fund trades are positively associated with a mispricing index constructed using
well-known stock return anomalies on the previous day, indicating that hedge funds purchase
under-valued stocks and sell over-valued stocks. In sharp contrast, the non-hedge fund order
flow is negatively associated with the same mispricing index. The results suggest that hedge
funds exploit arbitrage opportunities from stock return anomalies while non-hedge funds
trade in the opposite direction to exacerbate the anomalies. Overall, our findings indicate
that the superior trading skills of institutional investors are largely driven by hedge funds.
We do find that all institutional investors generate smaller contemporaneous price impact
than retail investors, suggesting that the skills of managing trading costs may be widespread
in the asset management industry.
The proposed estimation method for institutional order flow can be applied in other
empirical studies that require institutional order flow estimates at a daily frequency. We
apply the method to hedge funds and non-hedge funds in this study, but the method can
also be applied to other types of institutional trading, such as long-term and short-term
investors, or active and passive investors. Our analysis is based on stock-level institutional
order imbalance, and it would be interesting to combine it with fund-level analysis to gain a
more complete picture of the wider-reaching effects of institutional trading. We leave these
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questions to future studies.
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Appendix. Return anomalies
1. Net stock issues (Ritter (1991) and Loughram and Ritter (1995)): We calculate net
stock issues as the growth rate of split-adjusted shares outstanding in the past 252 trading
days between days t− 252 and t.
2. Composite equity issues (Daniel and Titman (2006)): We obtain composite equity
issues by subtracting log change of shares outstanding from a cumulative log share adjust-
ment factor in the past five-year window. The adjustment factor is equal to the log number
of shares if one reinvestment all cash distributions back into the stock.
3. Total accurals (Sloan (1996)): We measure total accruals as non-cash working
capital less than the depreciation expense, scaled by total assets in the previous fiscal year.
4. Net operating assets (Hirshleifer, et al. (2004)): We measure net operating assets
by subtracting all operating assets from all operating liability and scaling it by the total
assets in the previous fiscal year.
5. Momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)): Momentum factor is calculated as the
cumulative return between days t− 252 and t− 42.
6. Gross profitability (Novy-Marx (2013)): We use gross profitability scaled by total
assets in the same fiscal year.
7. Asset growth (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008)): Asset growth is defined as the
growth rate of total assets from the previous fiscal year to the current fiscal year.
8. Return on assets (Fama and French (2006) and Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang
(2011)): We calculate return on assets as quaterly earnings scaled by book equity value in
the last quarter.
9. Investment-to-asset (Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004)): We measure investment-to-
asset by adding gross property, plant, and equipment to change in inventories. We scale it
by book equity value in the last fiscal year.
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Table I. Summary statistics
This table shows the time-series averages of cross-sectional statistics for the sample during
January 1999 to March 2012. The sample includes all common stocks listed on NYSE,
AMEX, and Nasdaq with prices above five dollars that have information in TAQ, CRSP,
and Thomson Reuters’s 13F data. For each institutional order flow estimate, we calculate the
daily order imbalance as the aggregate buyer-initiated volume minus the aggregate seller-
initiated volume scaled by shares outstanding. HH is our proposed institutional order
flow described in Section II.B. AN is calculated using Ancerno data. CRS is the estimate
proposed by Campbell, Ramadoral, and Schwatz (2009). LR is the estimate of Lee and
Radhakrishna (2000) using $ 5,000 cut-off rule. HHHF and HHNHF are our proposed hedge
fund and non-hedge fund order flow, respectively, described in Section II.B. TOI is daily
total order flow in TAQ based on Lee and Ready (1993) algorithm. SPRD is daily relative
spreads measured as twice the distance between daily close offer and bid prices scaled by the
quote midpoint. TURN is daily turnover ratio defined as trading volume over the number
of shares outstanding. RET is daily risk-adjusted mid-quote stock return with respect to
Fama-French (2015) five factors. Panel A reports discriptive statistics. Panal B presents
correlation coefficients between institutional order flows and other variables.
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics
Number Avg Num.
of Dates of Stocks Mean Stdev Min Med Max
HH 3326 3073.2 0.025 0.158 -0.535 0.005 0.671
AN 3326 2042.1 0.004 0.137 -0.574 0.002 0.547
CRS 3326 3073.2 0.024 0.074 -0.163 0.006 0.357
LR 3326 3073.2 0.014 0.151 -0.558 0.002 0.646
HHHF 3326 2893.5 0.006 0.020 -0.053 0.002 0.096
HHNHF 3326 3071.6 0.019 0.121 -0.411 0.004 0.521
TOI 3326 3073.2 0.015 0.179 -0.694 0.003 0.779
SPRD 3326 3073.2 0.009 0.013 0.000 0.005 0.126
TURN 3326 3073.2 0.649 0.788 0.003 0.414 4.877
RET 3326 3068.9 0.000 0.027 -0.122 -0.001 0.153
Panel B. Correlation
HH AN CRS LR HHHF HHNHF TOI
HH 1.000
AN 0.875 1.000
CRS 0.352 0.003 1.000
LR 0.142 0.055 0.306 1.000
HHHF 0.712 0.512 0.459 0.134 1.000
HHNHF 0.957 0.886 0.397 0.164 0.638 1.000
TOI 0.127 0.061 0.303 0.946 0.144 0.173 1.000
SPRD -0.052 0.002 -0.107 -0.054 -0.064 -0.053 -0.056
TURN 0.148 -0.005 0.339 0.149 0.282 0.154 0.153
RET 0.096 0.103 0.069 0.241 0.088 0.119 0.305
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Table II. Daily return prediction in the cross-section
This table presents Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression results for the following equation.
Ri,t = αt +
5∑
k=1
βIt,kIOFi,t−k +
5∑
k=1
βTt,kTOIi,t−k + γ
B
t SPRDi,t−1 + γ
T
t TURNi,t−1 +
5∑
k=1
γRt,kRi,t−k + i,t,
where for stock i on day t, R is risk-adjusted mid-quote stock return with respect to Fama-French (2015)
five factors, IOF is an institutional order flow estimate indicated on the top of each column. The sample
includes all common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with prices above five dollars that have
information in TAQ, CRSP and Thomson Reuters’s 13F data from January 1999 to March 2012. All variables
are the same as defined in Table I. All coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100. Corresponding t-statistics
based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
HH AN CRS LR
Intercept -0.013** -0.038*** -0.008 -0.015***
(-2.57) (-6.62) (-1.61) (-2.88)
IOFt−1 0.122*** 0.097*** -0.155*** -1.349***
(11.71) (6.39) (-6.36) (-14.31)
IOFt−2 -0.020** -0.006 -0.091*** 0.125***
(-2.29) (-0.42) (-5.04) (2.83)
IOFt−3 -0.032*** -0.024* -0.074*** 0.027
(-3.98) (-1.71) (-4.10) (0.59)
IOFt−4 -0.048*** -0.031** -0.098*** -0.000
(-5.19) (-2.39) (-5.30) (-0.00)
IOFt−5 -0.039*** -0.018 -0.105*** 0.027
(-4.57) (-1.37) (-5.67) (0.62)
TOIt−1 0.123*** -0.039*** 0.152*** 1.337***
(11.91) (-3.39) (13.99) (15.22)
TOIt−2 -0.102*** -0.070*** -0.092*** -0.210***
(-12.47) (-7.39) (-10.89) (-5.11)
TOIt−3 -0.049*** -0.024** -0.040*** -0.074*
(-5.80) (-2.35) (-4.71) (-1.77)
TOIt−4 -0.026*** -0.013 -0.017** -0.033
(-3.13) (-1.27) (-2.00) (-0.79)
TOIt−5 -0.026*** -0.003 -0.017** -0.045
(-2.94) (-0.28) (-1.97) (-1.13)
SPRDt−1 2.364*** 7.080*** 2.264*** 2.409***
(10.38) (9.29) (9.97) (10.56)
TURNt−1 0.069*** 0.056*** 0.083*** 0.066***
(10.11) (9.20) (11.46) (10.38)
RETt−1 -1.215*** -0.727*** -1.205*** -1.545***
(-7.51) (-4.35) (-7.56) (-10.11)
RETt−2 -1.081*** -1.042*** -1.060*** -1.041***
(-9.21) (-7.02) (-9.12) (-8.83)
RETt−3 -0.653*** -0.423*** -0.663*** -0.648***
(-6.78) (-3.36) (-6.96) (-6.72)
RETt−4 -0.404*** -0.409*** -0.430*** -0.435***
(-3.92) (-3.15) (-4.20) (-4.23)
RETt−5 -0.205** -0.257** -0.235** -0.226**
(-2.00) (-2.01) (-2.32) (-2.21)
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.039 0.026 0.027
Observation 10,015,095 5,033,554 10,015,095 10,015,095
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Table III. Horse races in daily return predictive ability
This table presents Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression results with competing institutional
order flow estimates. We replicate the regression analysis in Table II using HH and another
institutional order flow in the same regression. For brevity, we only report the coefficient
estimates of order flow, while the regressions always include the full set of control variables.
The sample includes all common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with prices
above five dollars that have information in TAQ, CRSP, and Nasdaq from January 1999 to
March 2012. All coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100. Corresponding t-statistics based
on Newey-West (1987) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
AN CRS LR
Intercept -0.035*** -0.009* -0.013**
(-5.93) (-1.69) (-2.58)
HHt−1 0.073*** 0.188*** 0.156***
(3.24) (18.23) (15.59)
HHt−2 -0.018 -0.012 -0.023***
(-1.02) (-1.41) (-2.60)
HHt−3 -0.022 -0.027*** -0.034***
(-1.22) (-3.24) (-4.26)
HHt−4 -0.040** -0.038*** -0.046***
(-2.03) (-3.95) (-4.96)
HHt−5 -0.026 -0.027*** -0.039***
(-1.49) (-3.03) (-4.66)
IOFt−1 0.008 -0.289*** -1.407***
(0.27) (-10.98) (-14.81)
IOFt−2 0.014 -0.087*** 0.124***
(0.58) (-4.73) (2.83)
IOFt−3 0.006 -0.060*** 0.037
(0.22) (-3.17) (0.83)
IOFt−4 0.018 -0.073*** 0.011
(0.68) (-3.88) (0.24)
IOFt−5 0.018 -0.083*** 0.042
(0.75) (-4.32) (0.98)
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.027 0.028
Observation 5,033,554 10,015,095 10,015,095
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Table IV. Investment strategies based on institutional order flow
This table reports the performance of investment strategies based on estimated institutional
order flows (IOFs) as indicated on the top of each column. The sample includes all com-
mon stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with prices above five dollars that have
information in TAQ, CRSP, and Thomson Reuters’s 13F data from January 1999 to March
2012. We sort all stocks into decile portfolios based on IOFs every day. The average port-
folio returns on the next day are reported. Also reported are the return differentials and
alphas with respect to the Fama-French (2015) five factors between the top and bottom
decile portfolios. All variables are the same as defined in Table I. Corresponding t-statistics
based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
HH AN CRS LR
Low (%) 0.103 0.106 0.167 0.191
2 0.077 0.026 0.147 0.126
3 0.115 0.006 0.151 0.105
4 0.110 0.019 0.084 0.096
5 0.026 0.047 0.009 0.072
6 0.062 0.072 0.052 0.038
7 0.102 0.099 0.079 0.032
8 0.113 0.114 0.095 0.062
9 0.125 0.143 0.098 0.098
High 0.155 0.165 0.105 0.168
HML (%) 0.052*** 0.059*** -0.062*** -0.023
(6.81) (6.96) (-6.86) (-1.59)
FF5 Alpha (%) 0.049*** 0.056*** -0.063*** -0.007
(6.92) (6.99) (-8.13) (-0.67)
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Table V. Contemporaneous price impact of institutional trading
This table presents Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression results of risk-adjusted mid-quote stock
return on contemporaneous hedge fund order flow (HHHF ), non-hedge fund order flow
(HHNHF ) and various control variables. The sample includes all common stocks listed
on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with prices above five dollars that have information in TAQ,
CRSP, and Thomson Reuters’s 13F data from January 1999 to March 2012. All variables are
the same as defined in Table I. All coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100. Corresponding
t-statistics based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.034*** -0.016*** -0.027*** -0.038***
(-6.89) (-3.40) (-5.44) (-6.53)
HHHFt 11.142*** 2.043*** 1.008***
(50.44) (5.53) (2.91)
HHNHFt 2.636*** 2.363*** 1.418***
(60.89) (38.23) (29.41)
TOIt 4.403***
(90.02)
SPRDt−1 5.252***
(17.99)
TURNt−1 -0.149***
(-14.55)
RETt−1 -2.953***
(-19.74)
RETt−2 -1.894***
(-16.52)
RETt−3 -1.230***
(-13.16)
RETt−4 -0.825***
(-8.31)
RETt−5 -0.543***
(-5.49)
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.016 0.018 0.127
Observation 9,610,012 10,202,019 9,417,101 9,417,101
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Table VI. Private information in hedge fund and non-hedge fund
This table replicates Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression in Table II using our proposed hedge fund
(HHHF ) and non-hedge fund (HHNHF ) order flow estimates. For brevity, we only report the
coefficient estimates of order flow variables, while the regressions always include the full set of
control variables. The sample includes all common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq
with prices above five dollars that have information in TAQ, CRSP, and Thomson Reuters’s 13F
data from January 1999 to March 2012. All variables are the same as defined in Table I. All
coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100. Corresponding t-statistics based on Newey-West (1987)
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5,
and 10 percent level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -0.016*** -0.013** -0.016***
(-3.00) (-2.54) (-3.06)
HHHFt−1 1.508*** 1.603***
(18.49) (17.18)
HHHFt−2 -0.070 0.065
(-1.03) (0.79)
HHHFt−3 -0.175*** -0.026
(-2.74) (-0.32)
HHHFt−4 -0.322*** -0.096
(-4.65) (-1.24)
HHHFt−5 -0.233*** -0.020
(-3.38) (-0.24)
HHNHFt−1 0.137*** -0.015
(10.25) (-0.98)
HHNHFt−2 -0.024** -0.028**
(-2.07) (-2.03)
HHNHFt−3 -0.035*** -0.032**
(-3.34) (-2.37)
HHNHFt−4 -0.063*** -0.055***
(-5.36) (-4.28)
HHNHFt−5 -0.055*** -0.049***
(-5.04) (-3.71)
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.025 0.027
Observation 9,414,134 10,009,538 9,408,616
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Table VIII. Investment analysis of hedge/non-hedge fund order flow
This table documents the performance of investment strategies based on our proposed hedge
fund order flow (HHHF ) and non-hedge fund order flow (HHNHF ) described in Section II.B.
The sample includes all common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with prices
above five dollars that have information in TAQ, CRSP, and Thomson Reuters’s 13F data
from January 1999 to March 2012. We sort all the stocks into decile portfolios based on
IOFs every day. The average portfolio returns on the next day are reported. Also reported
are the return differentials and alphas with respect to the Fama-French (2015) five factors
between the top and bottom decile portfolios. All variables are the same as defined in Table
I. Corresponding t-statistics based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
HHHF HHNHF
Low (%) 0.111 0.107
2 0.083 0.084
3 0.098 0.129
4 0.045 0.114
5 0.028 0.016
6 0.061 0.053
7 0.077 0.092
8 0.099 0.113
9 0.128 0.130
High 0.192 0.150
HML (%) 0.082*** 0.043***
(10.95) (5.95)
FF5 Alpha (%) 0.080*** 0.042***
(11.04) (6.00)
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Table IX. Institutional trading on asset pricing anomalies
This table presents panel regression results with firm-fixed effect using the least squares
dummy variable (LSDV) method for the following equation,
OFi,t = βMISPi,t−1 + γFFirstWeeki,t−1 + γLLastWeeki,t−1
+ γFXFirstWeeki,t−1 ×MISPi,t−1 + γLXLastWeeki,t−1 ×MISPi,t−1 + i,t,
where for each firm i on day t, OF is an institutional order flow estimate as indicated on
the top of each column, FirstWeek (LastWeek) is a dummy variable for the first (last) week
in a month, and MISP is a mispricing index composed from nine categorical variables for
well-known stock return anomalies including net stock issues of Loughran and Ritter (1995);
composite equity issues of Daniel and Titman (2006); momentum of Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993); gross profitability of Novy-Marx (2013); return on assets of Chen, Novy-Marx, and
Zhang (2010); total accurals of Sloan (1996); net operating assets of Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh,
and Zhang (2004); asset growth of Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008); investment-to-assets
of Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004). HHHF and HHNHF are our proposed hedge fund and
non-hedge fund order flow, respectively, described in Section II.B. The sample includes all
common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with prices above five dollars that have
information in TAQ, CRSP, and Thomson Reuters’s 13F data from January 1999 to March
2012. All coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
HHHF HHNHF
MISP 0.833*** 0.988*** -4.315*** -3.434***
(4.34) (4.53) (-3.74) (-2.62)
First-Week 0.049** 0.359***
(2.18) (2.66)
Last-Week -0.110*** -0.298**
(-5.57) (-2.52)
First-Week ×MISP -1.213*** -5.104**
(-3.09) (-2.16)
Last-Week ×MISP 0.123 -0.442
(0.36) (-0.21)
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.051 0.026 0.026
Observation 1,730,798 1,730,798 1,790,153 1,790,153
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